O que os mercados pensam
Ontem, estava a dar comigo a fazer uma coisa que não acontecia há algum tempo, a suportar a argumentação pachecopereirana na quadratura do círculo sobre a actual situação. Mas quando o homem dá para meter-se a explicar o que pensam os mercados, acordei para a vida. Antes da crise da dívida soberana também havia muito gente a pensar que sabia o que pensavam os mercados, mas no fundo o que quase toda a gente dizia que os mercados pensavam era sobretudo aquilo que gostavam que os mercados pensassem, pois se os mercados assim pensassem servia que nem uma luva ao argumentário político e económico de quem nos contava o que os mercados estavam pensando. Se me permitem encontrar um melhor caminho para tentar perceber o que pensam os mercados, reconhecendo todas as falhas que cometerem no passado, ler os relatórios das agências de rating pode ser mais elucidativo do que ouvir o Pacheco Pereira [aqui]:
Following finance minister Vitor Gaspar's July 1 resignation, Paulo Portas, the leader of Portugal's junior coalition partner, also resigned. We understand the resignations followed difficult coalition negotiations on the public expenditure review measures. These measures had been presented by the government to the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund ("the Troika") as part of the Troika's seventh annual review of its financial support program ("Program") for Portugal, but still need to be passed by the parliament, and therefore require the support of the junior coalition. We believe the resignations could complicate the adoption of additional fiscal measures that may be needed to meet Program requirements. We also see an increased risk that coalition negotiations could falter, leading to early elections. We believe political instability in Portugal largely results from increased tensions as a result of the contracting economy, rising unemployment, and the need for the government to keep finding new fiscal measures to comply with the Program's targets. In April 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that a number of key budget adjustment measures of the 2013 budget were unconstitutional, which resulted in increased fiscal gaps in the first few months of 2013. The government has indicated that it will start to prepare the 2014 budget in the summer and allow controversial measures to be cleared by the court before the budget law is finalized in the autumn. However, we believe this plan could now be delayed or even derailed if the parliamentary approval process is delayed, or if elections are called during the summer. [...] We could consider lowering the ratings if Portugal's political and social tensions lead to significant departures from the Program terms, delaying disbursement of official funding. Political instability could also delay the 2014 budget, further increasing the general government deficit. This could push the public debt ratio higher next year and potentially increase it even further in 2015 or later, which could challenge Portugal's access to further loans from official creditors, after the current Program period. Our view of Portugal's relatively strong and predictable policy implementation capacity is a rating strength, which partly offsets its very unfavorable financial and economic indicators. However, if the government's problems cause us to take a more negative view of Portugal's institutional and governance effectiveness, this could exert downward pressure on the ratings. The ratings could stabilize at the current level if political tensions ease and the government maintains key Program commitments in a timely and predictable manner, thereby sustaining official support and raising the likelihood of a successful program exit and a return to unconstrained capital markets access.
O problema das agências de rating e dos mercados internacionais é que, ao contrário do que alguns aparentemente pensam, cá para mim estão longe de ser os que melhor percebem o que se passa em Portugal e há nuances da nossa situação que lhes passam despercebidas. Ou seja, é possível iludi-los. Por exemplo, sobre a «relatively strong and predictable policy implementation capacity», tenho sérias dúvidas se esta, depois do que Paulo Portas fez, não sairia reforçada com eleições antecipadas em contraponto com a manutenção em funções de um governo zombie. É que em verdade vos digo, não imagino este governo, qualquer que seja a solução «sólida» encontrada, a avançar para cortes a sério na despesa nos próximos meses. Mas sobre isso, falaremos no futuro.